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Phreaking

Phreaking is a slang term coined to describe the activity of a subculture of people who study, experiment with, or explore telecommunication systems, like equipment and systems connected to public telephone networks. The term "phreak" is derived from the words "phone" and "freak". It may also refer to the use of various audio frequencies to manipulate a phone system. "Phreak", "phreaker", or "phone phreak" are names used for and by individuals who participate in phreaking. Additionally, it is often associated with computer hacking. This is sometimes called the H/P culture (with H standing for Hacking and P standing for Phreaking). information on this site is for educational purposes only! Wyretap Network ©2007 - 2010

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Social engineering techniques and terms

All social engineering techniques are based on specific attributes of human decision-making known as cognitive biases.[1] These biases, sometimes called "bugs in the human hardware," are exploited in various combinations to create attack techniques, some of which are listed here:
Pretexting
Pretexting is the act of creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a targeted victim to release information or perform an action and is typically done over the telephone. It is more than a simple lie as it most often involves some prior research or set up and the use of pieces of known information (e.g. for impersonation: date of birth, Social Security Number, last bill amount) to establish legitimacy in the mind of the target. [2]
This technique is often used to trick a business into disclosing customer information, and is used by private investigators to obtain telephone records, utility records, banking records and other information directly from junior company service representatives. The information can then be used to establish even greater legitimacy under tougher questioning with a manager (e.g., to make account changes, get specific balances, etc).
As most U.S. companies still authenticate a client by asking only for a Social Security Number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name, the method is effective in many situations and will likely continue to be a security problem in the future.
Pretexting can also be used to impersonate co-workers, police, bank, tax authorities, or insurance investigators — or any other individual who could have perceived authority or right-to-know in the mind of the targeted victim. The pretexter must simply prepare answers to questions that might be asked by the victim. In some cases all that is needed is a voice that sounds authoritative, an earnest tone, and an ability to think on one's feet.
Phishing
Main article: Phishing
Phishing is a technique of fraudulently obtaining private information. Typically, the phisher sends an e-mail that appears to come from a legitimate business—a bank, or credit card company—requesting "verification" of information and warning of some dire consequence if it is not provided. The e-mail usually contains a link to a fraudulent web page that seems legitimate—with company logos and content—and has a form requesting everything from a home address to an ATM card's PIN.
For example, 2003 saw the proliferation of a phishing scam in which users received e-mails supposedly from eBay claiming that the user’s account was about to be suspended unless a link provided was clicked to update a credit card (information that the genuine eBay already had). Because it is relatively simple to make a Web site resemble a legitimate organization's site by mimicking the HTML code, the scam counted on people being tricked into thinking they were being contacted by eBay and subsequently, were going to eBay’s site to update their account information. By spamming large groups of people, the “phisher” counted on the e-mail being read by a percentage of people who already had listed credit card numbers with eBay legitimately, who might respond.
IVR or phone phishing
This technique uses a rogue Interactive voice response (IVR) system to recreate a legitimate sounding copy of a bank or other institution's IVR system. The victim is prompted (typically via a phishing e-mail) to call in to the "bank" via a (ideally toll free) number provided in order to "verify" information. A typical system will reject log-ins continually, ensuring the victim enters PINs or passwords multiple times, often disclosing several different passwords. More advanced systems transfer the victim to the attacker posing as a customer service agent for further questioning.
One could even record the typical commands ("Press one to change your password, press two to speak to customer service" ...) and play back the direction manually in real time, giving the appearance of being an IVR without the expense.
The technical name for phone phishing, is vishing.
Baiting
Baiting is like the real-world Trojan Horse that uses physical media and relies on the curiosity or greed of the victim.[3]
In this attack, the attacker leaves a malware infected floppy disk, CD ROM, or USB flash drive in a location sure to be found (bathroom, elevator, sidewalk, parking lot), gives it a legitimate looking and curiosity-piquing label, and simply waits for the victim to use the device.
For example, an attacker might create a disk featuring a corporate logo, readily available off the target's web site, and write "Executive Salary Summary Q2 2009" on the front. The attacker would then leave the disk on the floor of an elevator or somewhere in the lobby of the targeted company. An unknowing employee might find it and subsequently insert the disk into a computer to satisfy their curiosity, or a good samaritan might find it and turn it in to the company.
In either case as a consequence of merely inserting the disk into a computer to see the contents, the user would unknowingly install malware on it, likely giving an attacker unfettered access to the victim's PC and perhaps, the targeted company's internal computer network.
Unless computer controls block the infection, PCs set to "auto-run" inserted media may be compromised as soon as a rogue disk is inserted.
Quid pro quo
Quid pro quo means something for something:
An attacker calls random numbers at a company claiming to be calling back from technical support. Eventually they will hit someone with a legitimate problem, grateful that someone is calling back to help them. The attacker will "help" solve the problem and in the process have the user type commands that give the attacker access or launch malware.
In a 2003 information security survey, 90% of office workers gave researchers what they claimed was their password in answer to a survey question in exchange for a cheap pen.[4] Similar surveys in later years obtained similar results using chocolates and other cheap lures, although they made no attempt to validate the passwords.[5]
Other types
Common confidence tricksters or fraudsters also could be considered "social engineers" in the wider sense, in that they deliberately deceive and manipulate people, exploiting human weaknesses to obtain personal benefit. They may, for example, use social engineering techniques as part of an IT fraud.
The latest type of social engineering techniques include spoofing or hacking IDs of people having popular e-mail IDs such as Yahoo!, GMail, Hotmail, etc. Among the many motivations for deception are:
Phishing credit-card account numbers and their passwords.
Hacking private e-mails and chat histories, and manipulating them by using common editing techniques before using them to extort money and creating distrust among individuals.
Hacking websites of companies or organizations and destroying their reputation.

The Real ID Coming Soon!!!

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Russia Arrests Alleged Mastermind of RBS WorldPay Hack

Russia Arrests Alleged Mastermind of RBS WorldPay Hack

* By Kim Zetter Email Author
* March 22, 2010 |
* 2:10 pm |
* Categories: Crime, Crypto, Hacks and Cracks
*

Russian authorities have nabbed the man accused of masterminding a coordinated global ATM heist of $9.5 million from Atlanta-based card processing company RBS WorldPay.

Viktor Pleshchuk, 28, of St. Petersburg, was arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB, according to the Sunday Mail, which broke the story last week in the United Kingdom.

The Financial Times confirmed the arrest this week, adding that Pleshchuk was among “several suspects” arrested. The paper didn’t name the other suspects or say when any of them were arrested. The arrests are being touted by some as signaling a new era of cooperation between Russian and U.S. authorities.

Pleshchuk was indicted in the United States last November with Sergei Tsurikov, 25, of Tallinn, Estonia; Oleg Covelin, 28, of Chisinau, Moldova; and a fourth person identified only as “Hacker 3.” The government described the caper as “perhaps the most sophisticated and organized computer fraud attack ever conducted.”

The hack involved reverse-engineering PINs for payroll debit card accounts — the holy grail of bank card hacking.

RBS WorldPay, the payment-processing arm of the Royal Bank of Scotland, provides a number of electronic payment processing services, including debit card transactions, electronic benefits transfer payments (EBT), prepaid cards, credit card and ATM-processing services. The processor discovered in November 2008 that it had been hacked and that the intruders had accessed account details for 100 payroll cards — offered by some employers as a paperless alternative to paychecks.

The hackers compromised RBS WorldPay’s database encryption to raise the amount of funds available on the compromised cards, and boost their daily withdrawal limits. In some case, the hackers raised the limits to $500,000.

According to the indictment, Tsurikov conducted reconnaissance of the RBS network after Covelin provided him with information about vulnerabilities in the system. Pleshchuk and Covelin then worked on exploiting the vulnerabilities to obtain access. Pleschuk allegedly developed the method for reverse engineering the encrypted PINs.

Once the hackers raised the account limits, they provided an army of cashers with 44 cards programmed with the account details. On November 8 that year, the cashers simultaneously hit more than 2,000 ATMs, netting about $9.5 million in less than 12 hours.

The hackers were able to observe the withdrawals of funds from ATMs in real time in order to monitor the amounts being taken by cashers and lock the accounts to prevent further withdrawals. Once the mission was completed, the hackers tried to erase their tracks on the RBS network.

It’s unclear what kind of punishment Pleshchuk and the others might meet for their crimes. The United States lacks extradition treaties with Russia and some other East European countries, so in the past, American authorities have waited to grab suspects while they vacationed in more cooperative countries. In July 2007, Turkish authorities arrested Maksym “Maksik” Yastremskiy after he traveled there from Ukraine.

Even when authorities in some East European countries have nabbed carders wanted in the United States, prison time isn’t guaranteed. Another alleged carding ringleader who was nabbed in Ukraine in 2005 finagled his way out of prison with help from politial friends.

Dmitry Ivanovich Golubov is thought by American law enforcement officials to be the carder “Script,” one of the godfathers of Eastern European carding rings. Ukrainian police arrested Golubov in the summer of 2005 after much work by U.S. postal inspectors and other law enforcement officials in the United States. But about six months after his arrest, two Ukrainian politicians convinced a judge to release himon bond. He’s never been tried for his alleged crimes.

Former FBI special agent E.J. Hilbert, who worked diligently with others to convince Ukrainian authorities to arrest Golubov in 2005, is doubtful that Pleshchuk will do any serious time.

“The cooperation between the FBI and FSB related to this arrest is monumental, and I’m hopeful it truly is a new era of cooperation,” he told Threat Level. “But I am extremely skeptical. Any criminal making this amount of money will be well connected and thus protected.”

Though agents on the ground may do their best to work for a conviction, “they’re battling a corrupt system” Hilbert said.

Read More http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/alleged-rbs-hacker-arrested/#ixzz0jEvzrYTy

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