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Phreaking

Phreaking is a slang term coined to describe the activity of a subculture of people who study, experiment with, or explore telecommunication systems, like equipment and systems connected to public telephone networks. The term "phreak" is derived from the words "phone" and "freak". It may also refer to the use of various audio frequencies to manipulate a phone system. "Phreak", "phreaker", or "phone phreak" are names used for and by individuals who participate in phreaking. Additionally, it is often associated with computer hacking. This is sometimes called the H/P culture (with H standing for Hacking and P standing for Phreaking). information on this site is for educational purposes only! Wyretap Network ©2007 - 2010

Disclaimer: The information on this site is for educational and entertainment purposes only. It is not intended to encourage or teach you to break the law, that's what TV is for, albeit in a very flawed manner. The owner(s) of this website will not be held liable for anything you choose to do with the information contained on this site. If you want to learn how to rape, murder, loot, and commit acts of terror on a monumental scale, well, you won't find it here. Instead, tune-in to your nightly news and take a lesson from your 'elected' 'leaders'.

Social engineering techniques and terms

All social engineering techniques are based on specific attributes of human decision-making known as cognitive biases.[1] These biases, sometimes called "bugs in the human hardware," are exploited in various combinations to create attack techniques, some of which are listed here:
Pretexting
Pretexting is the act of creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a targeted victim to release information or perform an action and is typically done over the telephone. It is more than a simple lie as it most often involves some prior research or set up and the use of pieces of known information (e.g. for impersonation: date of birth, Social Security Number, last bill amount) to establish legitimacy in the mind of the target. [2]
This technique is often used to trick a business into disclosing customer information, and is used by private investigators to obtain telephone records, utility records, banking records and other information directly from junior company service representatives. The information can then be used to establish even greater legitimacy under tougher questioning with a manager (e.g., to make account changes, get specific balances, etc).
As most U.S. companies still authenticate a client by asking only for a Social Security Number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name, the method is effective in many situations and will likely continue to be a security problem in the future.
Pretexting can also be used to impersonate co-workers, police, bank, tax authorities, or insurance investigators — or any other individual who could have perceived authority or right-to-know in the mind of the targeted victim. The pretexter must simply prepare answers to questions that might be asked by the victim. In some cases all that is needed is a voice that sounds authoritative, an earnest tone, and an ability to think on one's feet.
Phishing
Main article: Phishing
Phishing is a technique of fraudulently obtaining private information. Typically, the phisher sends an e-mail that appears to come from a legitimate business—a bank, or credit card company—requesting "verification" of information and warning of some dire consequence if it is not provided. The e-mail usually contains a link to a fraudulent web page that seems legitimate—with company logos and content—and has a form requesting everything from a home address to an ATM card's PIN.
For example, 2003 saw the proliferation of a phishing scam in which users received e-mails supposedly from eBay claiming that the user’s account was about to be suspended unless a link provided was clicked to update a credit card (information that the genuine eBay already had). Because it is relatively simple to make a Web site resemble a legitimate organization's site by mimicking the HTML code, the scam counted on people being tricked into thinking they were being contacted by eBay and subsequently, were going to eBay’s site to update their account information. By spamming large groups of people, the “phisher” counted on the e-mail being read by a percentage of people who already had listed credit card numbers with eBay legitimately, who might respond.
IVR or phone phishing
This technique uses a rogue Interactive voice response (IVR) system to recreate a legitimate sounding copy of a bank or other institution's IVR system. The victim is prompted (typically via a phishing e-mail) to call in to the "bank" via a (ideally toll free) number provided in order to "verify" information. A typical system will reject log-ins continually, ensuring the victim enters PINs or passwords multiple times, often disclosing several different passwords. More advanced systems transfer the victim to the attacker posing as a customer service agent for further questioning.
One could even record the typical commands ("Press one to change your password, press two to speak to customer service" ...) and play back the direction manually in real time, giving the appearance of being an IVR without the expense.
The technical name for phone phishing, is vishing.
Baiting
Baiting is like the real-world Trojan Horse that uses physical media and relies on the curiosity or greed of the victim.[3]
In this attack, the attacker leaves a malware infected floppy disk, CD ROM, or USB flash drive in a location sure to be found (bathroom, elevator, sidewalk, parking lot), gives it a legitimate looking and curiosity-piquing label, and simply waits for the victim to use the device.
For example, an attacker might create a disk featuring a corporate logo, readily available off the target's web site, and write "Executive Salary Summary Q2 2009" on the front. The attacker would then leave the disk on the floor of an elevator or somewhere in the lobby of the targeted company. An unknowing employee might find it and subsequently insert the disk into a computer to satisfy their curiosity, or a good samaritan might find it and turn it in to the company.
In either case as a consequence of merely inserting the disk into a computer to see the contents, the user would unknowingly install malware on it, likely giving an attacker unfettered access to the victim's PC and perhaps, the targeted company's internal computer network.
Unless computer controls block the infection, PCs set to "auto-run" inserted media may be compromised as soon as a rogue disk is inserted.
Quid pro quo
Quid pro quo means something for something:
An attacker calls random numbers at a company claiming to be calling back from technical support. Eventually they will hit someone with a legitimate problem, grateful that someone is calling back to help them. The attacker will "help" solve the problem and in the process have the user type commands that give the attacker access or launch malware.
In a 2003 information security survey, 90% of office workers gave researchers what they claimed was their password in answer to a survey question in exchange for a cheap pen.[4] Similar surveys in later years obtained similar results using chocolates and other cheap lures, although they made no attempt to validate the passwords.[5]
Other types
Common confidence tricksters or fraudsters also could be considered "social engineers" in the wider sense, in that they deliberately deceive and manipulate people, exploiting human weaknesses to obtain personal benefit. They may, for example, use social engineering techniques as part of an IT fraud.
The latest type of social engineering techniques include spoofing or hacking IDs of people having popular e-mail IDs such as Yahoo!, GMail, Hotmail, etc. Among the many motivations for deception are:
Phishing credit-card account numbers and their passwords.
Hacking private e-mails and chat histories, and manipulating them by using common editing techniques before using them to extort money and creating distrust among individuals.
Hacking websites of companies or organizations and destroying their reputation.

The Real ID Coming Soon!!!

The Real ID Coming Soon!!!

Sunday, September 5, 2010

Adobe Flash Player user-assisted privacy compromise

From: Alexander Klink
Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 00:14:35 +0200
Security Advisory for

Adobe Flash Player – user-assisted privacy compromise
=====================================================

Date released: 04.09.2010
Date reported: 08.03.2010
$Revision: 1.1 $

by Security Testlab
  Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
  http://testlab.sit.fraunhofer.de/

Vendor: Adobe
Product: Flash Player
Website: http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/
Vulnerability: privacy problem
Status: unpatched
Adobe ID: 451

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Summary:

Adobe uses the so-called »Settings Manager« to configure aspects of the Flash
Player application. As the Settings Manager is itself only a flash applet at a
specific URL, it can be spoofed and used to set privacy-related parameters,
such as allowing access to the camera and microphone for an attacker-chosen
domain.

The only security measure in place to prevent this for an attacker is that the
Settings Manager has to be retrieved using HTTPS from www.macromedia.com. Thus,
the attacker has to be in a position to control traffic from the user (e.g. a
MiTM situation). Also, user interaction and a moderate amount of social
engineering might be needed to convince the user to accept a certificate for
www.macromedia.com.

Attackers with access to a rogue certificate authority (such as
– maybe – your friendly neighbourhood government agency, see
http://files.cloudprivacy.net/ssl-mitm.pdf) may have a slight advantage
here.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Technical details:

The Settings Manager is located at the following URL:

http://www.macromedia.com/support/documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings_manager.html

As noted before, the Settings Manager is a flash applet itself, which leads to
the nice note »The Settings Manager that you see above is not an image; it is
the actual Settings Manager.« on the website.

The flash applet is located at
http://www.macromedia.com/support/flashplayer/sys/settingsmanager.swf,
which in turn loads another applet from
https://www.macromedia.com/support/flashplayer/sys/settingsmanager2.swf
(Note the https URL, Flash Player versions earlier than 8 retrieved this
applet via HTTP only)

This applet is now allowed to change the settings for domains which
already have a Local Shared Object (aka »Flash cookie«) set. In particular,
it is possible to set the options for camera and microphone access.

In our proof of concept exploit, this is how the communication
takes place (given that the user has not yet accepted a certificate
for www.macromedia.com). All files on the rogue www.macromedia.com
referenced below have been modified to serve our PoC exploit.

- The user accesses the (rogue) Settings Manager at
 https://www.macromedia.com/[...]/settings_manager.html
 (maybe by being forced if the attacker can modify normal HTTP traffic)
 If the attacker is lucky, the user ignores the certificate warning
 and accepts the certificate. If the attacker is powerful, then there
 is no certificate warning
- This page contains an invisible iframe load_evil.html, which redirects
 to evil.html on the HTTP server, as settingsmanager.swf has to be
 retrieved using HTTP. evil.html in turn contains an embed-tag to load
 the modified settingsmanager.swf
- settingsmanager.swf writes a dummy LSO, so that the domain is known
 in the next step. After that, it loads settingsmanager2.swf via HTTPS.
- settingsmanager2.swf can now be used to allow the video and camera
 to be turned on for www.macromedia.com. Our PoC sets this option for
 all domains (just because we can and it was easier to implement).
 It then redirects to hidden_record.flv, which uses the camera and
 microphone to record the user and sends the data via RTMP to a
 haxeVideo server.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Communication:

* 08.03.2010: Informed Adobe PSIRT about the issue
* 08.03.2010: Adobe PSIRT responds and asks for PoC files
* 10.03.2010: SIT sends PoC files
* 12.03.2010: Adobe PSIRT asks for individual files instead of VMWare image
* 18.03.2010: SIT sends individual PoC files
* 13.04.2010: Conference call regarding status and possible solutions
             between SIT and Adobe PSIRT
* 25.05.2010: SIT pings Adobe PSIRT for status update and information
             on which solution is chosen
* 17.06.2010: SIT pings Adobe PSIRT again for status update
* 17.06.2010: Adobe PSIRT responds that it is still investigation options
* 06.08.2010: SIT pings Adobe PSIRT for status update and informs them
             of intended release on the weekend 3.-5. September
* 06.08.2010: Adobe PSIRT replies that it is looking into the option of
             implementing a GUI, »which has proven to be time-consuming«.
             No schedule for a fix is yet available.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Solution:

Adobe currently does not offer a patch for this security issue.

Mitigation is possible though by not allowing the Flash Player to
use the microphone and camera.

Add a line like this:

AVHardwareDisable = 1

to your mms.cfg. For more information about configuring/restricting
Flash Player using mms.cfg, see

http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/flash_player_admin_guide/flash_player_admin_guide.pdf

Gaffa tape may be effective for blocking camera access as well, but
may be less helpful for blocking microphone access.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Credits:

- Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology,
 Security Testlab

--
Alexander Klink, Fraunhofer SIT
Forschungsbereich Anwendungs- und Prozesssicherheit
Rheinstr. 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
Telefon: +49 6151 869-229
mailto:alexander.klink () sit fraunhofer de
http://www.sit.fraunhofer.de

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